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Realism, Antirealism, and
Conventionalism about Race
Jonathan Michael Kaplan and Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther*y
This paper distinguishes three concepts of “race”: bio-genomic cluster/race, biological
race, and social race. We map out realism, antirealism, and conventionalism about each
of these, in three important historical episodes: Frank Livingstone and Theodosius
Dobzhansky in 1962, A. W. F. Edwards’s 2003 response to Lewontin’s 1972 paper, and
contemporary discourse. Semantics is especially crucial to the first episode, while
normativity is central to the second. Upon inspection, each episode also reveals a variety
of commitments to the metaphysics of race. We conclude by interrogating the relevance
of these scientific discussions for political positions and a post-racial future.
There are no races, there are only clines. (Livingstone 1962, 279)
If races did not exist they would have to be invented. (Dobz-
hansky 1968, 78)
Human racial classification is of no social value and is posi-
tively destructive of social and human relations. (Lewontin
1972, 397)
But it is a dangerous mistake to premise the moral equality of
human beings on biological similarity because dissimilarity,
once revealed, then becomes an argument for moral inequality.
(Edwards 2003, 801)
*To contact the authors, please write to: Jonathan Michael Kaplan, The School of History,
Philosophy, and Religion, Oregon State University, 322 Milam Hall, Corvallis, OR 97331;
e-mail: JonathanKaplan@oregonstate.edu. Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther, Philosophy Depart-
ment, University of California, Santa Cruz, 1156 High St., Santa Cruz, CA 95064; e-mail:
rgw@ucsc.edu.
yWinther thanks Carlos López Beltrán, Marcus Feldman, and Amir Najmi for ongoing dis-
cussions on these matters and Alexandre Dor and Cory Knudson for research assistance; he
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1. Introduction. Sharp ontological lines are being drawn in the debates
surrounding genomics and race. Some claim that our finest genomic data
and methodology indicate that human races are biologically real entities
(e.g., Neven Sesardić, Quayshawn Spencer). Others follow the well-established
antirealist perspective that has been developed since Richard Lewontin’s
influential 1972 paper “The Apportionment of Human Diversity” (e.g., Joshua
Glasgow). And, along with others (e.g., Kenneth Weiss and Stephanie Fuller-
ton), we articulate a constructivist conventionalism, arguing that our best
genomics forever underdetermines the existence of biologically real human
races (Kaplan and Winther 2013; Winther and Kaplan 2013; see Spencer
2012 for critique). In other words, either realism or antirealism can be justi-
fied given particular choices and norms about how to interpret the biological
data and which mathematical methods to use.
In this paper, we distinguish three kinds of racial realism:
1. Bio-genomic cluster/racial realism claims that population structure
exists in Homo sapiens, assessed through genomic or “phenomic” (e.g.,
anthropometrics) measures (e.g., Theodosius Dobzhansky, Neil Risch).1
2. Biological racial realism affirms that a stable mapping exists between
the social groups identified as races and groups characterized genomi-
cally or, at least, phenomically.2 That the groups are biological popu-
is partially supported by a faculty research grant from the Academic Senate Committee on Re-
search at the University of California, Santa Cruz. For comments on this article, both authors
thank Doc Edge, Anthony W. F. Edwards, James Griesemer, Michael Hunter, Richard C.
Lewontin, Roberta Millstein, Omri Tal, and an anonymous reviewer, as well as the other sym-
posium participants and audience members at the PSA session “The State of Race in Popu-
lation Genetics” and at a “Genomics and Philosophy of Race” workshop (http://ihr.ucsc.edu
/portfolio/philosophy-in-a-multicultural-context/?id=15003) held at Stanford in November
2013, sponsored by the Institute for Humanities Research at University of California, Santa
Cruz; the Computational, Evolutionary, and Human Genomics Center at Stanford University;
and Science and Technology Studies at University of California, Davis, and organized by Edge
and Winther. This paper was written fully jointly.
1. We introduce a forward slash here because this kind of realism is not necessarily about
a “race” concept (see Winther and Kaplan 2013, n. 1). As made evident in the workshop
on “Genomics and Philosophy of Race,” some influential and socially responsible pop-
ulation geneticists have no desire to become involved in debates over race. However,
genomic work of this sort is often taken to be about race, and it is not clear that the
slippage is avoidable (see, e.g., Reardon 2005; Feldman 2010; Morning 2011; Donovan
2014).
2. We call this “biological racial realism” because the term has a history in these debates.
Some of the confusion in the current literature stems from failing to distinguish what we
call “bio-genomic cluster/race” fromwhat has often been called “biological race.”Acknowl-
edging the existence of population structure need not in any way imply a hereditarian
commitment to the reality of biologically based properties and differences constituting
(or explaining) either the existence of socially identified races or, especially, the “racial”
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lations explains why the particular social groups, and not others, are
so identified. Furthermore, for some, but by no means all, biological
racial realists, the existence of biological populations (and of the bio-
logically grounded properties of their constituent individuals) explains
and justifies at least some social inequalities (e.g., the “hereditarians”;
Jensen 1969; Herrnstein and Murray 1995; Rushton 1995; Lynn and
Vanhanen 2002).
3. Social racial realism defends the existence of distinct human groups
in our ordinary discourse and social interactions. Such groups are often
identified and stabilized by “surface” factors such as skin color or fa-
cial features. Moreover, while this is not strictly necessary for social
racial realism, group membership is often correlated with access (or
not) of goods, services, and wealth.
We argue that conventionalism rather than realism is the proper stance
toward what we call “bio-genomic cluster/race.”Whether it is legitimate, as a
matter of biological practice, to divide the human species into smaller pop-
ulations depends on the purposes, methods, and metrics at play (Winther and
Kaplan 2013). Biological racial realism demands a one-to-one mapping
between biologically defined groups and social groups and insists that bi-
ological facts explain some of our social practices and judgments sur-
rounding “race.” We reject the existence of such a correspondence and hence
are antirealists about biological race. Commitments to realism, antirealism,
or conventionalism about either bio-genomic cluster/race or biological race
are broadly independent of questions regarding the reality of races under-
stood as populations with socially ascribed meanings—entities that are real
because those populations are socially identified, entrenched, and main-
tained (Kaplan and Winther 2013; Winther and Kaplan 2013). While we
recognize that a post-racial future is possible and even desirable, for now,
realism about social races is the best description of the practices, expecta-
tions, and norms of many contemporary societies, though possibly not all.3
In short, we are conventionalists about bio-genomic cluster/race, antirealists
about biological race, and realists about social race.4
3. A post-racial future in which race is no longer associated with differential access to so-
cial goods and services, but perhaps continues to have some social relevance, is distinct from
one in which people no longer “see” race at all, at least as a social organizing principle.
4. More generally, each of these concepts of “race” and racial realism corresponds to a
set of debates and discourses on race, as Doc Edge pointed out to us. Bio-genomic cluster/
race concerns, e.g., which population genetic measures and methods should be used
to identify human clusters and groups, whether there is an appropriate level(s) of human
characteristics about which debate revolves: e.g., IQ or health (disparities). We thank an
anonymous reviewer for drawing our attention to this.
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This article maps out realism, antirealism, and conventionalism in three
important historical episodes: Frank Livingstone and Theodosius Dobzhansky
in 1962, A. W. F. Edwards’s 2003 response to Lewontin (1972), and contem-
porary discussions. Semantics is especially crucial to the first episode, while
normativity is central to the second. Upon inspection, each episode also re-
veals diverse commitments to the metaphysics of race. We conclude by inter-
rogating the relevance of these scientific discussions for political positions
and a post-racial future.
2. (Anti)Realisms about Race. I. Livingstone and Dobzhansky. Argu-
ments surrounding whether human races are biologically real remain in-
tractable, in part, because of a persistent confusion about what is at stake.
Debates about the biological reality of human races have always been less
about the biology and more about which social meanings, expectations, and
actions we attribute to race.
Consider the 1962 back-to-back exchange in Current Anthropology be-
tween Frank Livingstone, an anthropologist responsible for groundbreaking
work on sickle-cell anemia and for popularizing the application of popula-
tion genetics reasoning to human populations, and Theodosius Dobzhan-
sky, who was one of the founders of modern genetics as well as Lewontin’s
mentor. Livingstone argues that “there are no races, there are only clines.” He
claims that “the explanation of the genetic variability among human pop-
ulation” would best be approached “in terms of the concepts of cline and
morphism” (rather than “the discrete packages labeled races”) using “the
mathematical theory of population genetics” to uncover the contributions of,
for example, “mutation, natural selection, gene drift, and gene flow” to the
actual gene frequencies, and gene associations, in particular populations. In
humans, race has “been overworked as an explanation of this variability”
(Livingstone 1962, 279), and its continued use threatens to obscure rather
than elucidate both the extant variation and its evolutionary sources (281).
Dobzhansky (1962), however, contends that race, as a biological con-
cept, demands that we be able to identify populations differing in “the fre-
quencies of one or more, usually several to many, genetic variables” and that
there were, obviously, human populations that met this requirement. Further,
since clines “are steeper where natural, or social, impediments to travel and
population structure that makes sense to privilege and emphasize, and whether clinal vari-
ation is a better description. Biological race discourse addresses the biological correlates of
social racial groupings and social inequalities. Finally, discourse about social race is about
the influence social identification and treatment have on inequality—issues of affirmative
action and “color blindness” are, for instance, important in this third set of debates. A fur-
ther project would investigate these broad overlapping discourses rather than the narrower
commitments of realism, antirealism, and conventionalism about each of the three concepts.
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intermarriage interpose obstacles to gene exchange, and more gradual where
the gene exchange is unobstructed,” and these same factors result in the cor-
relation of “different variable characters, and the gene frequencies underly-
ing them,” races are “more easily nameable” than Livingstone’s analysis sug-
gests (280). Livingstone responds that a definition of “race”making reference
to any “genetically unique” “breeding population” (281) does not “accord with
the general use of the term” (280).
Livingstone takes “race” to mean discrete populations bound by com-
mon ancestry with notable genetic and phenotypic differences resulting from
isolation, and finding only clines, he rejects the existence of races; the use of
“race” in humans points toward biological racial realism, a realism that is to
be rejected. Dobzhansky takes the proper semantic use of “race” to demand
only a difference in gene frequencies, and finding such differences, he af-
firms the existence of races; a bio-genomic cluster/racial realism is thus en-
dorsed. In short, Livingstone cares about whether biology can vindicate “the
general use of the term”; Dobzhansky is interested in how the term can be
deployed within biology. Since 1962, substantially more evidence in sup-
port of the empirical claims made by both authors has accumulated, but
there is no settling the reality of race in this debate, because they were using
two distinct concepts of race, biological and bio-genomic, respectively.5
3. (Anti)Realisms about Race. II. Edwards and Lewontin. Elsewhere we
have reviewed methodological and statistical details of Edwards’s 2003
critique of Lewontin’s 1972 antirealist conclusions about biological race
(Kaplan 2011; Winther 2011, 2014; Kaplan and Winther 2013; see also An-
dreasen 2007; Tal 2012). Here we focus on normative concerns. These are
foregrounded because themethodological differences between Lewontin and
Edwards may not be as significant as some believe, and because they may
even be asking different questions. Briefly, Lewontin (1972, 396) claims that
at typical loci most of the variation is within groups rather than between
groups (85.4% among individuals within populations; 8.3% across popula-
5. Below we note some ways in which echoes of Livingstone’s position can be found
in, e.g., Glasgow (2009) and Hochman (2013), and echoes of Dobzhansky’s position in
Sesardić (2010) and Spencer (2012, 2013). Moreover, the historically situated assump-
tion that there is significantly more variation across broad racial groups rather than within
can be seen clearly in the writings of some of the key participants in the 1966 American
Association for the Advancement of Science symposium “Science and the Concept of
Race” (Mead et al. 1968). Ginsburg and Laughlin (1968) write as if the human species
were very genetically diverse (but, we know now, it is not; see Li and Sadler 1991);
Kilham and Klopfer (1968) confidently state that different breeds of domesticated ani-
mals are far more alike genetically than are human races (they are not; e.g., Vilà, Mal-
donado, and Wayne 1999); Dobzhansky’s position can be seen in the epigraph above,
which continues, “Since they do exist they need not be invented, they need to be under-
stood.”
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tions within the three continental races; 6.3% across continental races).6 Ed-
wards (2003) concurs and adds that in spite of small group differences at
individual loci, pooling information across loci allows for efficient clustering.
Lewontin now affirms that using information from many loci to cluster (e.g.,
Rosenberg et al. 2002) is fundamentally a sound procedure: “The continental
clustering in these large sets of data derives mainly from small differences in
allele frequencies at large numbers of markers, not from diagnostic genotypes.
This clustering reflects the history of human migrations” (Feldman and Le-
wontin 2008, 92). However, this was never the question about the “average
amount of genetic diversification between and within geographical groups”
(90) thathas interestedhimall along. The broad methodological agreement, as
well as the focus on different questions, suggests that the most important
disagreements between Lewontin and Edwards lie in normative domains, be-
yond data and statistical methods.
Lewontin contrasts the vast importance tied to social ascriptions of ra-
cial identity with the tiny amount of genetic difference actually found among
broad races as typically defined. His finding that only a very small fraction
(about 6%) of the total human genetic diversity was “assignable” to what we
usually thought of as races serves to undermine our ordinary understanding
of racial differences as biological (1972, 397). Racial categories are thus of
“virtually no genetic or taxonomic significance” (397). He makes the nor-
mativity explicit thus: “The taxonomic division of the human species into
races places a completely disproportionate emphasis on a very small frac-
tion of the total of human diversity. That scientists as well as nonscientists
nevertheless continue to emphasize these genetically minor differences and
find new ‘scientific’ justifications for doing so is an indication of the power of
socioeconomically based ideology over the supposed objectivity of knowl-
edge” (Lewontin 1974, 156). That is, genetics cannot be responsible for the
creation, maintenance, and importance of our current socially important ra-
cial categories. Put differently, the contingency and weakness of the mapping
between genetic differences and social races undermine the continued use of
genetics in explaining and justifying social races (see, e.g., Lewontin 1970,
1972, 1974, 1993, 1995; Feldman and Lewontin 1975; Lewontin, Rose, and
Kamin 1984; see also Kaplan 2000). Politics and science intertwine (see also
Lewontin epigraph above). Biological racial realism fails, under Lewontin’s
analysis, because there is no one-to-one mapping from bio-genomic clusters/
races to social races.
6. See Jobling, Hurles, and Tyler-Smith (2004, table 9.1, 278) for a presentation of ap-
portionment percentages found by three other important studies (including Barbujani
et al. 1997) in addition to Lewontin (1972). The means of all four studies, for autosomal
loci, are as follows: 84.3% (within population), 4.5% (between groups within continental
populations), and 11.19% (between continental populations). Note the significantly higher
across-race apportionment.
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The normativity of Lewontin’s stance stems from his tireless critique
of hereditarianism. Jensen (1969), Herrnstein and Murray (1995), Rushton
(1995), Lynn and Vanhanen (2002), Wade (2014), and others have argued
that many important current social and political inequalities, both within and
between nations, are due in large part to hereditary differences in the (average)
“native” abilities between races as usually conceived.7 While there remains no
knock-down argument against this position, Lewontin’s critiques are tren-
chant.8 Moreover, Lewontin interprets the market penetration of biological
racial realism in intellectual and political life as evidence of the “power of
socioeconomically based ideology” (1974, 156) and wishes to resist it, in
part because of its scant genetic justification (similarly, see the various re-
views ofWade ½2014, including Coop et al. ½2014, a letter signed by around
140 geneticists denouncing Wade’s “guesswork” and “conjectures”).
Edwards takes Lewontin and other antirealists to task for letting their pol-
itics influence their science. He submits that premising—or at least map-
ping—moral equality on genetic similarity runs the risk of backfiring, should
genetic dissimilarity among broad human populations turn out to exist
(see Edwards epigraph above). In order to avoid this consequence, Edwards
strongly distinguishes discovering bio-genomic cluster/race from any social
or political uses to which one could put such knowledge: “A proper analysis
of human data reveals a substantial amount of information about genetic
differences. What use, if any, one makes of it is quite another matter” (Ed-
wards 2003, 801). Edwards’s analysis seems motivated by a high-level nor-
mative concern to not allow moral or political positions to impact science.
We interpret this as Edwards defending a bio-genomic cluster/racial realism
while remaining ontologically noncommittal about, and perhaps uninterested
in, biological race or social race.
Rereading this debate with the bio-genomic cluster/race versus biologi-
cal race distinction in mind, and focusing on normative concerns, helps clar-
ify many of the outstanding issues. Lewontin does not deny that there is pop-
ulation structure in humans, or even that bio-genomic clusters/races can be
found (cf. Feldman and Lewontin 2008, which seems to support a realism
about bio-genomic cluster/race), but is rather trying to block the usual infer-
ence from purported genetic differences—mistakenly considered to be sig-
7. For instance, see the recent controversy surrounding Jason Richwine’s association
with a Heritage Foundation report against immigration given his dissertation’s claims
regarding the lower IQs of “Hispanic” immigrants (Parker and Preston 2013).
8. Hereditarians may suggest that differences in native abilities lie hidden in the 6% (or
11.19%; see n. 6) of variation among continental races found by Lewontin (1972) (and
others), or in the correlational structure across loci, waiting to be discovered by further
mechanistic and statistical genomic study. Lewontin and others might here wish to ask
what role the hereditarians would ascribe to the approximately 8% (or 4.5%) of variation
among populations within continental races (e.g., Lewontin 1995).
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nificant—to justifications for the existence and importance of social races.9
Edwards seems motivated by moral and political principles as well (includ-
ing about how science should be practiced) but worries that Lewontin adopts
the wrong strategy in not keeping his science and his political principles clearly
separate.
While the Livingstone-Dobzhansky debate is much more about seman-
tics than about normativity, the conclusions about (anti)realisms parallel
one another. Similarly to Lewontin, Livingstone is an antirealist about bio-
logical race; Dobzhansky and Edwards are both explicit realists about bio-
genomic cluster/race.
4. (Anti)Realisms about Race. III. Contemporary Discourse. The bio-
genomic cluster/racial realist (e.g., Dobzhansky and Edwards) is concerned
with whether, as a matter of biological practice, we ought to recognize hu-
man subpopulations as legitimate biological entities, and not with biology’s
ability to explain and to justify current social practices surrounding race. Using
the same standards biologists employ in other domains to identify subpopu-
lations worthy of biological attention, can we pick out legitimate human sub-
populations? In the contemporary literature, Sesardić (2013) writes as if this
were the primary question of interest for biological racial realism, though we
believe that more properly this question pertains to bio-genomic cluster/racial
realism. Spencer is explicit that his defense of biological race in the case of
humans is meant to appeal to this kind of question (Is “race” in humans a
“genuine” scientific kind?), and he explicitly distances his position both from
“ordinary” understandings of what kinds of things races are and from social
concerns (Spencer 2012, 196–97).We read him as a bio-genomic cluster/racial
realist. When Hochman (2013) attacks the realism of human races, arguing
that the population structure of the human species would not justify treating
similar populations as worthy of attention in nonhuman populations, he is
critiquing bio-genomic cluster/race. Long and Kittles (2003) launch a similar
attack.
This debate surrounding the reality of bio-genomic clusters/races can
be practiced roughly independently of concerns about the biological reality
of races understood as the robust, socially ascribed populations usually thought
of as races in our ordinary discourse. That is, a realist about bio-genomic cluster/
race merely affirms that there are subpopulations of humans that are biolog-
ically legitimate subpopulations in the (weak) sense that biologists would pick
9. Lewontin correctly reminds us that clustering generally requires sampling from geo-
graphically distinct populations and would be problematic if undertaken with historically
“mixed” populations; after all, “human history has confounded the biological processes
of differentiation” (personal communication,December 7, 2013;Weiss and Fullerton [2005]
make a similar point). Indeed, this is why Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1988) collected gene fre-
quencies from 42 populations of “world aborigines.”
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them out as worthy of interest in otherwise similar nonhuman species. Un-
der our constructivist conventionalist analysis, we argue that some biolo-
gists would recognize subdivisions within the human species as interest-
ing and worthy of attention in a similar nonhuman species; other biologists
would not recognize any such subdivisions (Kaplan and Winther 2013; Win-
ther and Kaplan 2013).
But all of this skirts the issue of whether populations picked out thusly
deserve to be called “races.” Since “race” has an established use when refer-
ring to human populations, one should refrain from using the term where that
application is not the one intended. Slippage between bio-genomic usages
and social usages has serious consequences.10 One realist argument notes
that insofar as some of these populations are not entirely orthogonal to so-
cially identified races, biology can pick out, as a legitimate category of inter-
est, race-like populations, especially at the level of continents (see Risch et al.
2002). That is, this realist argument notes that, while the match is not perfect,
populations socially identified as races overlap significantly with some pop-
ulations that can be picked out using, for example, modern genomic cluster-
ing techniques and hence that at least some bio-genomic clusters/races are
also social races (see Kaplan 2011; Kaplan and Winther 2013).11
But some antirealists argue that many populations picked out by these
biological approaches will not resemble social races. That is, many bio-genomic
clusters/races will be much smaller or narrower populations than races as
usually conceived, and some will simply be different. And any associations
between bio-genomic clusters/races and social races will thus be unstable as
social racial classifications change over time (see, e.g., Weiss and Fullerton
2005). Other antirealists stress the clinal nature of variation and deny that
clusters found are sufficiently independent of the statistical methods used
to develop them to properly count as biologically meaningful in a robust way
(e.g., Serre and Pääbo 2004). Finally, because socially manufactured racial
ascriptions have enormous impacts on the lives of the people so ascribed but
do not map neatly onto bio-genomic cluster/race, many social race realists and
biological antirealists disregard debates about bio-genomic cluster/race. Es-
sentially all socially important goods and services are distributed unequally
with respect to populations picked out on the basis of racial ascriptions as
10. Pigliucci and Kaplan’s (2003) suggestion that human subpopulations with genetic dif-
ferences due to local adaptations maintained by selection be referred to as “ecotypes” rather
than “races” evokes Livingstone’s concerns about accurately describing the sources of var-
iation, as well as concerns about the dangers of conflating various meanings of the poly-
semic term “race.”
11. Another, very different, realist argument notes that insofar as our social categories
themselves create and reinforce biological and biomedical differences, those social cat-
egories will be populations of real biological interest, although here the causal arrow
points from the social to the biological (see Gravlee 2009; Kaplan 2010).
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embodied in our everyday discourse.12 Given this fact, to ask whether these
populations are also bio-genomically legitimate subpopulations, under some
understanding of how genomic and “phenomic” practices properly pick out
subpopulations, is pointless. That is, identifying bio-genomic clusters/races
sheds no light on the importance of socially ascribed racial categories in our
lives.
In the end, the hope that biology would permit us to determine, once and
for all, whether races are biological entities is dashed. This failure does not
represent a failure on the part of our best biology, but a failure to take se-
riously that the questions posed to our best biological practices are, in this
case, inextricably mired in assumptions and practices from other disciplines
and society at large. The answer we give to the question “Are ‘races’ bio-
logically real?” probably tells us more about our own beliefs (about what
the question means, about what work the answer is supposed to do) than
it does about the biological nature of populations. Even our bio-genomic
cluster/racial classifications may turn out to be (often ugly) depictions of our
socially entrenched biases and expectations, rather than pristine renditions
of objective biological reality.
5. Conclusions: Politics and Post-racial Futures. Mills (1988) provides a
useful taxonomy of some of the positions one might hold regarding the ex-
istence of races; these range from the denial of their existence (Glasgow 2009)
to the belief in biologically real deep racial “essences.” We find Mills’s “ob-
jective constructivist” position to be the most plausible: (social) races are
real, and their reality emerges from, and is continually reinforced by, our
(contingent, but no less powerful for that) social practices. Of course, the
reinforcement is itself contingent. A post-racial society is possible and
desirable.
With respect to the existence of population structure in the human spe-
cies and the best way(s) to determine and classify that structure, we have
argued for a constructivist conventionalism. There are many questions one
can ask, and a given question can be approached from multiple perspectives
and with a plurality of aims and methodologies. Answers to clearly stated ques-
tions, once well specified, are not arbitrary. For instance, there is a nonam-
12. The literature on the importance of race as socially ascribed categories (not depen-
dent for their force on biological correlates) is vast. We motion here toward, e.g., Omi and
Winant (1986), Appiah (1989), and Appiah and Gutmann (1996). The contingency of the
categories that are identified as “races” and the ways in which a person’s race, as a socially
meaningful classification, can (and does) depend on their location (including global con-
text; see, e.g., López Beltrán 2011) further complicates this picture (see, e.g., Hudson
1996; Harawa and Ford 2009; Ousley, Jantz, and Freid 2009). Marshall (1968) explicitly
ties the difficulties in understanding “race” as a scientific concept to the instability of the
concept as applied socially.
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biguous, correct answer to a clustering analysis given a particular distance
metric, clustering methodology (with explicit assumptions), and concrete
population (Kaplan andWinther 2013;Winther and Kaplan 2013). However,
nothing makes one question or another the obviously correct one. The bio-
genomic constructivist conventionalism we defend has affinities with the
“deep conventionalist” position with respect to biological categories more
generally, as articulated by Barker and Velasco (2013).
Further, in the context of bio-genomic cluster/race, such a convention-
alist position is demanded by our best evidence, and will remain the best
position, with respect to these kinds of questions. This does not imply that
conventionalism about related positions is required. There is no straight-
forward link between a defensible realism about bio-genomic clusters/races
and defending biological racial realism, and so a conventionalism about
the first does not demand a conventionalism about the latter. Rather, we
strongly hold antirealism to be the appropriate ontological stance toward
biological races (Winther andKaplan 2013, 71–72). Nor is there any reason
to suppose that the conventionalism demanded by issues surrounding bio-
genomic cluster/race would apply to social race. Here, we suggest, one can
(and should) be a realist about race as an objective (albeit socially con-
structed and historically contingent) fact about the social world, while main-
taining that discoveries surrounding the population structure in humans are
largely irrelevant to the major issues engendered by the social categories of
race.
We conclude with a reflection on the politics of the ontology of race.
Biological racial realism is typically coupled with positions on the “right”
of the political spectrum; antirealism about biological race is frequently
linked with the “left.” The contingency of these associations has not been
well recognized. Although biological racial realism has been used to argue
that the massive inequalities between the life prospects of members of the
different races are not signs of injustice (e.g., Jensen, Lynn, Murray, Rushton,
Vanhanen), nothing about biological racial realism demands such a right-
wing position. Indeed, a Rawlsian liberal would have no difficulty condemn-
ing the extraordinary differences in average life prospects between the races
even if she endorsed biological racial realism. Moreover, while race “pride”
or consciousness movements are typically leftist, some of these adopt bio-
logical racial realism (often implicitly). Similarly, although biological racial
antirealism is associated with liberal positions calling for state action to cor-
rect social and economic injustices that are, it is argued—and which we also
believe—responsible for the current inequalities, this need not be the case.
Conservatives sometimes adopt the view that the choices, decisions, and be-
haviors of individuals, against a claimed backdrop of equality of opportunity,
are the source of current inequalities, and they use biological equality as an
additional cudgel to support laissez-faire approaches.
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Again, whilewe are conventionalists about bio-genomic cluster/race, we are
not conventionalists about biological race. Rather, we are antirealists about
biological race. But rejecting biological racial realism need not be tied to any
particular political project; nor, for those who disagree with our assessment
of the evidence, should supporting such realism be so associated.
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